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An Historical Critique of the
Emergence and Evolution of Ernesto
Che Guevara's Foco Theory*
MATT D. CHILDS
Abstract.This article provides an analysis of Ernesto Che Guevara's theory of
guerrillawarfare,the foco. The numerous changes to the originalfoco thesis, as
presented in Guerrilla Warfare(1960), are examined in detail covering two dozen

articles,speeches,essays, interviewsand books authoredby Guevara,Castroand
Debray while stressing their relation to national and internationalpolitics. The
author argues that there was an apparentdiscourse between Cubanpolitics and
the numerous changes in Guevara's writings. Juxtaposing changes to the foco
theory from I960 to 1967, to Cuban historical events, reflects the political
expedience of the i96os and the primary interests of the fidelistas,specifically
Guevara.
Scholarly analysis of the Cuban Revolution, both inside and outside Cuba,
describes the role the sierra (guerrillas) and llano (urban underground)
played in the overthrow of Batista. Maurice Halperin, in his recently
published memoirs, points out the uneven focus in Cuban historiography
on the sierra's role in the Revolution: 'Although the underground played
a crucial role in the triumph of Castro's guerrilla forces, the full story has
never been told to this day.'1 According to Halperin, 'Castro
discouraged... publicity concerning the underground exploits [because] it
could diminish the exclusive role he wished to attribute to his guerrilla
troops...in the overthrow of Batista's government.'2 As a result, the
* The author would like to thank Ernest Boyd, Edward Gonzalez,
Juan Moreno, and
Roberto Oregel, in addition to the anonymous JLAS referees, for their helpful
comments and suggestions; however, the author is solely responsiblefor the content
of the article and any errors or oversights.
1Halperintaughtat the Universityof Havanaand servedas an economic advisorin Cuba
between 962 and 968 where he worked closely with manyhigh officialsof the regime,
including Ernesto Che Guevara. The quote is taken from an early publication of his
memoirs which appeared as 'Return to Havana: Portrait of a Loyalist', in Cuban
Studies/Estudios Cubanos,vol.
2

23 (I993),

pp. I87-93.

Ibid., p. I88. Halperin is certainly not the first to make this observation. The
historiographyof the Cuban Revolution as commented on by Andres Suarez, 'The
Cuban Revolution: The Road to Power', Latin AmericanResearchReview,vol. 7, no.
3 (Fall, 1972), pp. 5-29, notes the paucityof materialon the llano'scontributionto the
Matt D. Childs is a doctoral student at the University of Texas at Austin.
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history of the Cuban Revolution, especially in the I96os, by elevating and
focusing on the role of Castro and his supporters, while neglecting the
activities of the urban underground, served to justify and strengthen the
fidelistas' centrality in the Cuban political apparatus.
The selective emphasis and representation of the Cuban Revolution by
veterans of the Sierra Maestra is apparent not only in the historiography,3
but numerous other areas such as politics, culture, economics, and society.
In this article I will focus specifically on the corpus of writings on guerrilla
warfare produced in Havana following the Revolution,
with special
attention given to how the ahistorical representation of the sierra affected
the emergence and evolution of Ernesto Che4 Guevara's guerrilla warfare
theory, the foco.5 I will argue that there existed an implicit - and
sometimes an explicit- discourse between national and international
politics and formulation of the foco theory. The gradual, yet noticeable,
evolution of the foco theory from 1960 to 1967 reflects a fundamental
distortion of the Cuban guerrilla experience, reveals the primary interests

Batista struggle. Fidel Castro himself later acknowledged the sierra biass in 1968:
'[A]lmost all attention, almost all recognition, almost all the admiration and almost all
the history of the Revolution has centred on the guerrilla movement in the mountains.
And this fact tended to play down the role of those who fought in the clandestine
movement, and the extraordinary herosim of young persons who died fighting under
very difficult conditions.' Quoted in Edward Gonzalez, Cuba Under Castro: The Limits
of Charisma (Boston, 1974), pp. 91-2. Three works, among others, which adequately
address the role of the llano in the revolutionary war are Ram6n L. Bonachea and Marta
San Martin, The Cuba Insurrection,r9f2-19y9 (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1974);
Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom(New York, I97I); and useful documents
on llano activities can be found in the work by one-time regime supporter Carlos
Franqui, Diario de la RevolucidnCubana (Paris, 1976).
3 For
example see Ernesto Che Guevara, Reminiscencesof the Cuban RevolutionaryWar,
trans., Victoria Ortiz (New York, I968).
4 Throughout this essay Che will be written without the accent which numerous authors
place over the e. I have chosen not to use the accent because Che himself never
employed it nor did Fidel Castro in their correspondence, whether it was linguistically
correct or not. Ernesto Guevara officially became El Che 'on 9 January I959 [when]
the council of ministers made Che Guevara a Cuban citizen, and at that time, he
legalised Che as part of his name'. Taken from the introduction by John Gerassi to
Ernesto Che Guevara, Venceremos!The Speechesand Writingsof Che Guevara(New York,
1968), p. 14. Guevara actually became an official citizen of Cuba on 9 February 1959.
See 'Che Guevara, I959-I 967: Cronologia', Universidaddela Habana (Julio-Dic, I967),
pp. 270-6.
5 Thefoco theory will be elaborated and analysed later. In brief, the 'foco' refers to a small
guerrilla band located in the mountains, while the 'foco theory', or 'foquisimo', refers to
the primacy given to the rural armed struggle centralised in the sierra with emphasis on
subjective conditions. The terminology may be confusing since the 'foco theory' and
the 'foco' itself have distinct connotations. Throughout this essay the 'foco theory' will
refer to the guerrilla warfare literature authored by Guevara, Debray, and Castro. The
'foco' will represent the insurrectionary force.
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of the fidelistas, most prominently Guevara, and offers insights into the
strong divisions within the government as they spilled onto the pages of
guerrilla warfare. This point will be demonstrated through a close
examination of the 'Escalante Affair' where the foco theory and national
and international politics all intertwined. Before delving directly into the
foco theory, it is first necessary to address its overall significance and the
empirical base from which it emerged, the Cuban Revolution.
The Importanceof the Foco Theory
A critical examination of the foco theory will address several important
issues. First, and most obviously, why did thefoco theory change? Second,
a critical analysis of thefoco theory enables a better understanding of Che's
Bolivian fiasco whereby it becomes obvious that the strategy and tactics
of Bolivia differed from those of the Sierra Maestra. Third, nearly every
Latin American guerrilla movement of the I96os adopted Guevara's
theory. And fourth, an examination of how and why the foco theory
changed illustrates that it did change from Guerrilla Warfare to Che's
death, which many authors do not acknowledge. For example, the
respected Mexican political scientist Jorge G. Castafeda in his latest book,
Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left After the Cold War, cites Che's
I960 tenet that 'where a government has come to power through some
form of popular vote, fraudulent or not, and maintains at least an
appearance of constitutional legality, the guerrilla outbreak cannot be
promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle have not yet been
exhausted'.6 Castafieda then goes on to comment in a footnote that 'it is
worth noting that on various occasions and in several countries, the
Cubans and Latin guerrillas themselves disregarded Guevara's law'.7
Castafeda does not recognise that Guevara himself changes his own 'law'
in an article published in CubaSocialistaduring I963 in which he dropped
the democratic corollary and advocated armed struggle in existing
democracies such as Venezuela.8
6

Jorge G. Castafeda, UtopianUnarmed:TheLatin AmericaLeft aftertheColdWar(New
York, 1993), p. 329. For lengthy reviews of Utopia Unarmedsee essays by Enrique A.

Baloyra, Gustavo Gorriti, and Anthony P. Maingot all in the Journalof Interamerican

Studies and World Affairs, vol. 36, no. I (Spring, I994),

pp. 150-85;

and James

Dunkerley, 'Beyond Utopia: The Stateof the Left in LatinAmerica', New-LeftReview,

no. 206 (July-Aug.,

1994), pp. 27-43.

Castafeda, UtopiaUnarmed,p. 329, fn. 2.
8 The
article, which Castafiedawas not aware of or did not recognise, is actually well
known and will be analysedlater; Ernesto Che Guevara, 'Guerra de Guerrillas:Un
7

Metodo', Cuba Socialista (Sept., 1963), pp.

I-17.

Perhaps even more surprising, Regis

Debray, who surely studied the article, was thanked by Castafiedain the preface for
reading the manuscript.Castanedais by no means the first not to take account of the
importantchangesin Guevara'sguerrillathought, and hence the need for such analysis.
The well known spokesman for the American 'new-left', I. F. Stone, who knew
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The importance of the foco theory in Cuba's foreign policy throughout
the I96os until Guevara's death cannot be overemphasised.
As Jorge I.
Domfnguez pointed out in his book, To Make a World Safe for Revolution,
it became the guiding principle of Cuba's international organisations such
as the Organisation of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS) and Tricontinental, both of which sought to combat Cuba's isolation.9 The
Guevarista line also served as a medium by which Cuban communism
stood in clear contradistinction from the Marxism-Leninism
of the Soviet
Union as it advocated the primacy of subjective conditions, the ability to
speed up history, not to mention its mocking attitude of detente. In
addition, as Edward Gonzalez argues, the Cuban Revolution's
strong
following in Latin America increased the value of Cuba as an ally to the
Soviet Union, multiplying the island's worth several fold in Moscow.10
The Cuban Revolution caused shock waves that resonated throughout
the hemisphere, qualifying 95 9 as the watershed date in the history of the
armed Latin American left, or as Castafieda appropriately labels the year,
the 'Cuban Crucible'.1 While it is undoubtedly true that the left's overall
following increased as a result of Castro's victory, at the same time it
became increasingly sectarian and divided.12 Among the Latin American

Guevara personally, made the same comment in an obituary/homage article which
appeared in New Statesman(20 October 967) and reprinted as a 'Prefatory Note' to the
1968 Vintage edition of Guerrilla Warfare. Equabal Ahmad was also unaware of the
change when he criticised Debray's Revolutionin the Revolution?claiming there is 'no
discussion of Che Guevara's contention that guerrilla insurgency cannot succeed
against a government which is able to maintain some legitimacy through the pretense
of democracy'. Eqabal Ahmad, 'Radical But Wrong', in Leo Huberman and Paul M.
Sweezy (eds.), Regis Debray and the Latin American Revolution(New York, I968), p. 73.
9 'Once the revolution had won
power at home, Cuba had to attempt to make the world
safe for its revolution.... Cuban leaders [sought] to make a world safe for revolution
in order to promote and safeguard their values, advance their interests, achieve their
ambitions and enhance their influence.' Jorge I. Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for
Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1989), pp. 6-7.
10 'Fidelista movements in Latin America not
only offered the means by which Cuba could
overcome its hemispheric isolation, but also provided Castro either with the means for
maintaining and revitalising Soviet interests in Cuba as a revolutionary base, or with
a negotiable issue with which he could bargain for major Soviet concessions.' Edward
Gonzalez, 'Relationship with the Soviet Union', in Carmelo Mesa-Lago (ed.),
RevolutionaryChangein Cuba (Pittsburgh, I970), p. 87.
1 Castafieda, Utopia Unarmed,pp. 5 -90.
12 For a discussion of the left in Latin America following the Cuban Revolution, see the
following: Richard Gott, Guerrilla Movementsin Latin America (Garden City, New
the well detailed 'case studies' of guerrilla movements in seven Latin
York, I972);
American countries from the i96os to the mid i98os in Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare,
introduction and case studies by Brian Loveman and Thomas M. Davies Jr. (Lincoln,
Nebraska, I985); Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Guerrillas e Revolution in Latin
America: A ComparativeStudy of Insurgentsand Regimes Since 9If6 (Princeton, 1992);
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left, the overwhelming issue of division involved the primacy of objective
or subjective conditions in the armed struggle. Fidel Castro plainly stated
the Cuban position favouring subjective conditions in the famous Second
Declaration of Havana, (i 962) declaring: 'The duty of every revolutionary
is to make the revolution!l13
Unsurprisingly, the foco theory and students of the Cuban Revolution
found its strongest following in Nicaragua where Fidel Castro and Che
Guevara provided inspiration in an almost religious manner. Tomas
Borge described Fidel Castro as 'the resurrection of Sandino, the answer
to our reservations, the justification of the dreams of heresy of a few hours
before'.14 The influence of the Cuban Revolution is further reflected in the
opening lines of the Sandinista oath: 'Before the images of Augusto Cesar
Sandino and Ernesto Che Guevara, before the memory and the heroes and
martyrs of Nicaragua, Latin America and all of humanity, before history:
I place my hand on the red-and-black banner that signifies Patria Libre o
Morir!'5 While it is true that during the early years of the FSLN (I96os)
adherence to the foco theory was strictly maintained, it later became an
issue of division. Beginning in the mid-1970s three tendencies emerged
within the FSLN over what tactics to pursue, specifically challenging the
viability of thefoco theory in Nicaragua. Today, the continuance of this
division within the FSLN remains one of the major obstacles to creating
an effective political party. In fact, the present division within the FSLN
Thomas C. Wright, LatinAmericain theEeraof theCubanRevolution
(New York, g199);
and in particular, WilliamE. Ratliff, Castroismand Communismin Latin America,
19y9-1976: The Varieties of the Marxist-Leninist Experience (Stanford, 1976).
13 Despite Castro's commitment to the armed struggle, in I964 Cuba hosted the

Conference of Latin American Communist Parties, giving high priority to various
guerrilla movements and agreeing with the Soviet Union on the unfavourabilityof
revolutionaryconditionsin othercountries.Cubantolerancefor severalLatinAmerican
communistpartiesunwilling to adopt the armedstruggle servedto strengthenrelations

with the Soviet Union. See Ratliff, Castroismand Communism,passim, and Appendix A,
pp. I95-9.

14 Tomas Borge, Carlos,el Almaneceryanoes unaTentacion
(Managua,I 989), p. 27. See also
his work La PacienteImpaciente
(Managua,1989); the autobiographicalwork by Omar
Cabezas,La Montanaes Algo MdsQue un EnormeEstepa Verde(Managua, i982); and
Ernesto Cardenal,En Cuba(Mexico, I977) all provide insight into the importanceof
the Cuban Revolution from high ranking Sandinistas.Also, works by David Nolan,
FSLN: Ideology
andtheNicaraguan
Revoluiton
of theSandinista
(Miami,I 984); and Donald
Hodges, IntellectualFoundations
of the NicaraguanRevolution(Austin, 1986) are both
essential.
15 Quoted in StephenKinzer, TheBloodof Brothers:Life andWarin Nicaragua(New York,
1991), p. 62. While the importance of the Cuban Revolution to the Sandinistas was

immensein providing a model and a theory, one authorexaggerateswhen he describes
Che Guevaraas 'the single most importanticon for revolutionaryNicaraguans'.The
author apparently has forgotten the name of the Nicaraguan revolutionariesSandinistas!Wickham-Crowley,Guerrillas& Revolution
in Latin America,p. 227.
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can trace its origin to the interpretation of the applicability of the foco
theory in Nicaragua.l1
Guevara's theory served Cuban foreign policy. Until his death in I967
it became the main tool, guiding ideology and providing inspiration for
those insurgents who aligned themselves with Cuba. In addition, to the
painful realisation of many guerrillas, defeat of the foco theory became the
primary obsession of United States foreign policy towards Latin America.
Loveman and Davies claim:
[I]n many respects, it may be said that the last quartercentury of United States
foreign policy toward Latin America has consisted essentially of defeating the
threat, the legacy, the legend of Ernesto 'Che' Guevara- the most important
martyrof revolutionarystruggle in Latin America in the twentieth century,17
Che Guevara's writings on guerrilla warfare found a receptive audience
not only in Latin America, but throughout the world. In the United
States, during the I96os, several groups went beyond simply quoting Che
Guevara, as Stokely Carmichael often did, and put his theory into practice.
The 'Weathermen' during their 'Days of Rage' in Chicago legitimised
their actions through Guevara's doctrine of dividing United States forces
through the creation of 'one, two, three ... many Vietnams'. Further, the
Black Panthers operated a guerrilla training centre in Cuba, and, as leader
Eldrige Cleaver commented, seriously considered adopting the foco
theory: 'Trained and equipped forces would be dropped into the
mountain areas of North America. The plan here was to have small mobile
units that could shift easily in and out of rural areas, living off the land,
and tying up thousands of troops in fruitless pursuit.'18
The analysis in this article of the emergence and evolution of the foco
theory will follow a rather simple method: the primary writings of
Guevara, Regis Debray, and to a lesser extent Fidel Castro will be
examined as they appeared chronologically, while placing them in their
proper historical and political context.19 In all, over two dozen documents
16

The emergence of this division during the I970S is clearly detailed in Nolan's work.
The persistence of the division and the obstacles they currently present is tightly
analysed by Andres Perez, 'The FSLN After the Debacle: The Struggle for the
Definition of Sandinismo',Journal of InteramericanStudies and World Affairs, vol. 34, no.

17

Brian Loveman and Thomas P. Davies Jr., 'Preface' to Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare
(Lincoln, Nebraska, I985), p. ix.
Eldridge Cleaver, Soul on Fire (Waco, Texas, 1978), p. 108. He further commented that
there 'was much excitement over the possibilities of building of units, surrounded by
acres of revolutionary camps and personnel, all working rigorously'. He also added, to

i (Spring,

18

I992),

pp.

11 -39.

emphasiseits perceived importanceat the time, 'I do not mean to be sarcastic;but in
retrospectthe grand design seems pretty ridiculous'.
19 A two volume edition entitled ObrasCompletas,s9f7-i967 (Havana, I970) contains
almost all of Guevara's important works on guerrilla warfare. Most of Guevara's
writings have been translatedinto English. The best sourcefor reliabilityin translation,
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will be surveyed to permit a thorough critique. Analysis will be enhanced
by various studies, most of them introductions to Guevara's and Debray's
writing, which address the foco theory. Unfortunately, Guevara's works
have not been subjected to scholarly criticism, most with commentary
simply referring to his unorthodox Marxism. Debray, on the other hand,
has been highly scrutinised and blamed for most of the flaws of the foco
theory.20 Apparently, Debray was easier to criticise, since an attack on the
apostle of armed struggle would have jeopardised Havana's support.
Indeed, according to Dominguez: 'Cuba expects to be recognized as the
leader of international revolutionaries because it believes it has the correct
strategy for victory... [I]t does not support revolutionary movements that
do not defer to Cuba.'21
Because of the need for brevity in this article, I will treat Guevara's,
Debray's, and Castro's writings as one unit. Although different tendencies

completeness, and introduction is Che: SelectedWorksof ErnestoGuevara,edited by
Rolando E. Bonacheaand Nelson P. Valdds(Cambridge,Massachusetts,I969). Several
works not found in the Bonacheaand Valdes edition arein Gerassi'sVenceremos!.
Che's
and
book length works such as Guerrade Guerrillas,Pasajesde la GuerraRevolucionaria,
Diario del Che en Boliviahave all been translated into English and gone through
numerous editions. Debray's importantessays are found in Regis Debray, Strategyfor
edited with an introductionby Robin Blackburn(New York, I97I). His well
Revolution,
known lengthy essayhas been publishedin book form, Revolution
in theRevolution
?, with
an introduction by Leo Hubermanand Paul M Sweezy, (New York, I967). Debray's
writings following his releasefrom prison such as the ChileanRevolution:Conversations
with Allende (New York, I971); Che's Guerrilla War (Harmondsworth, I975); and
Critique of Arms (New York, I977) will not be examined in detail. Only those works

by Fidel Castro which clearly deal with guerrilla warfare such as the Second
Declaration of Havana will be addressed. The political context is covered in the
following: Theodore Draper, Castroism:TheoryandPractice(New York, 1965); Jorge
I. Dominguez, Cuba:Orderand Revolution
(Cambridge,Mass., 1978); Gonzalez, Cuba
UnderCastro;Marifeli Perez-Stable, The CubanRevolution:Origins,Courseand Legacy
(New York, 1993); Andres Suarez, Cuba: Castroismand Communism,is9g-z966
(Cambridge,Mass., 1967); and Thomas, Cuba: ThePursuitof Freedom.
20 For analysis of Guevara's writings see the introductions by Loveman and Davies,
GuerrillaWarfare;Bonachea and Valdes, Che; Gott, GuerrillaMovements;Gerassi,
Venceremos!;Donald Hodges, The Legacy of Che Guevara:A Documentary
Study
(London, 1975), pp. 11-75; Michael Lowy, TheMarxismof Che Guevara:Philosophy,
Economicsand Revolutionary
Warfare(New York, I973); Sheldon B. Liss, Marxist
Thoughtin Latin America (Berkeley, 1984), pp. 256-65;

and Carlos Jesis Delgado, 'La

concepci6n de la guerrarevolucionariade guerrillasde Ernesto Che Guevara', Casade
las Americas, no. I63 (Julio-Aug.,

21

1987), pp. 25-36.

Debray's works are analysed

admirably by Harmut Ramm, Marxism of Regis Debray:BetweenLenin and Guevara
(Lawrence,Kansas, 1978).In addition,see the introductionby Blackburnto Strategy
for
Revolution
and the collection of essays by prominent members of the Latin American
Left in Hubermanand Sweezy (eds.), RegisDebrayandthe Latin AmericanRevolution.
Dominguez, To Make a World Safe for Revolution,pp. 124-5.

60o

Matt D. Childs

existed in their writings, they were neither significant nor a point of
contention during the period I959-67. According to Ramm and others,
there existed, in fact, a large degree of co-authorship and co-editing of
each others' works. The difficulty in separating their different perspectives
is that authorship is often attributed to someone other than the actual
author. For example, Bonachea and Valdes credit Guevara for authorship
of the Second Declaration of Havana. 'Che developed a radical categorical
imperative: The duty of the revolutionaryis to make the revolution.To push
history, to catalyze, is the function of the revolutionary' (italics in
original).22
One could argue, however, that after Guevara's death and Fidel's
condoning of the USSR's invasion of Czechoslovakia, a division emerged
in the interpretation of Guevara writings.23 In Venezuela, Douglas Bravo
of the FALN declared himself a guevaristabut not a fidelista due to the
Czech invasion.24 Thus, the divergences and connotations around such
titles as guevaristaor fidelista do not describe differences among Che and
Castro, but rather peoples' interpretation of their ideas. Before proceeding
to examine Guevara's writings, beginning with Guerrilla Warfare, it is
necessary to touch briefly upon the empirical base from which the foco
theory was drawn, the Cuban Revolution.
The Cuban RevolutionaryWar
As already indicated by Maurice Halperin, the 'official' history of the
Cuban Revolution does not adequately address the role of the llano. While
the llano has yet to receive the same attention of historians as the sierra,
several works describe llano activities during the Revolution.25 Most
works on the Cuban Revolution propagated by the state simply start with
Batista's coup of 10 March I952, followed by Castro's Moncada assault,
and then a narrative of the Rebel Army's activities from the December
1956 Granma'shipwreck', as Guevara put it, to Batista's flight into exile.
Descriptions of the llano's role in the Cuban Revolution tend to focus on
failures such as the Student Directorate's attack on the Presidential Palace
in an attempt to assassinate Batista, the death of Frank Pais on 30 July
22 Bonachea and
Valdes, 'Introduction', p. 28. I am confident that Bonachea and Valdes
are aware that Castro authored the SecondDeclaration of Havana. Their point, and mine
as well, is that their writings are so similar that they can be treated as by one author,
or coauthors. Davies and Loveman make the same assumption: 'Guevara's primary
message was that the duty of revolutionaries is to make revolution', p. 14; as does
Lowy: 'Che's famous slogan: The duty of a revolutionary is to make revolution', p.
23 Hodges, Legacy of Che Guevara, pp. 3 -3.
21.
24
Ratliff, Castroism and Communism,pp. 03-1 I.
25 For
example, see the sources listed in fn. 2.
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1957, or the failure of the 9 April

1958 general strike. For example,

Guevara writes: 'April 9th was a painful failure which did not for a
moment succeed in threatening the regime's stability. Far from it: after
this tragic date the government was able to withdraw its forces and send
them little by little to Oriente, to sow destruction as far as the Sierra.'26
According to Guevara, insurgent activities of the llano not only failed to
remove Batista from power, but in turn made the armed struggle even
more difficult for the sierra.
After the revolutionary victory, Cuban historiography purposely
ignored the important role groups other than the fidelistas played in
elevating the revolutionary environment. The failure of each group to
attain power served to put the burden of the revolution on Fidel Castro's
shoulders, but with the burden also came support. Domfnguez succinctly
summarises how the sierra emerged as the leader of the revolution,
partially by default.
The insurrectionist opposition to Batista gradually concentrated around the
person of Fidel Castrothrough a mixture of competence, shrewdness,and luck.
Castro'sluck, in the form of accidentaleliminationof any alternativeleaders,was
remarkable. The Prio-financed attack on the Goicuria military barracks in
Matanzasin April 1956 failed; Barquin'splot in April 1956 failed; the university
studentattackon the PresidentialPalacein March 19577failed and ended with the
death of Havana student leader, a serious rival, Jose Antonio Echeverrfa;the
Prio-financed landing of the Corintha expedition in May I957 failed; the

Cienfuegos naval uprising failed; Frank Pafs, leader of the Oriente provincial
undergroundof the Twenty-Sixthof July Movement, Castro'smost serious rival
within the organization,was killed in July I957; the generalstrike of April I958
failed, and led to the subordinationof the urbanand labour undergroundto the
leadershipin the mountains.27
The important point to note is that Castro did not emerge as the
undisputed leader in the struggle against Batista until the second half of
I 958. According to Gonzalez, prior to the failure of the general strike, the
'guerrillas remained a virtual appendage of the July 26 Movement',
playing only a secondary role in the overall struggle.28 The initial
revolutionary strategy of the July 26 Movement confirms Gonzalez's
statement. Throughout the revolutionary war, until April 1958, strategy
called for armed struggle in the countryside to weaken the Batista
dictatorship, with the final blow to be delivered by a general strike. After
April, Castro placed primacy on the armed struggle, recalling the July 26
Movement urban leader in Havana, Faustino Perez, to the Sierra
Maestra.29Nonetheless, Castro still recognised the importance of the llano,
26 Guevara, Reminiscences,
p. 243.
27

28

Dominguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution,p.

Gonzalez, CubaUnderCastro,p. 86.

I27.

29

Ibid.
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by his call for a general strike on I January 959 to ensure a complete rebel
victory.30

One could surmise that Guevara, Castro and Debray did not
incorporate the llano experience into the foco theory since they were not
personally associated with the struggle in the city, and, as a result, did not
grasp its overall significance in the overthrow of Batista. While there is
surely some validity to this hypothesis, several examples tend to counter
it. First, as cited above, Castro called for a general strike on I January
1959. Second, Castro's micromanagement political style, whereby he is
personally involved and informed on all activities, suggests that he was
well aware of llano activities.31 And third, there are several documents by
Guevara from the first half of 19 59 which acknowledge the importance of
the llano.
On 19 January I959, Guevara spoke at the headquarters of the Cuban
Confederadion of Labour. 'I have not come here to be paid homage, but
to pay tribute in the name of the Rebel Army to the Cuban working
class.'32 After recognising the role of the working class in the
revolutionary struggle, he claimed Latin America ripe for the overthrow
of dictatorships, but not the defeat of the bourgeoisie. This speech, given
before Cuba joined the socialist camp, suggests that Castro and Guevara
may have initially sought a workable relationship with the national
bourgeoisie. Also, only three weeks before, Castro looked down on Cuba
from the Sierra Maestra while Guevara battled in Las Villas; thus, they did
not yet grasp their political strength to move against the national
bourgeoisie and initially wanted to extend their political base in order to
prevent any counterrevolutionary activity.
Less than ten days later, Guevara once again extolled the role of the
urban working class in the Revolution.33 He commented on the important
role of the llano in complementing the activities of the Rebel Army:
The victories of the Rebel Army and the great effortsof the undergroundcreated
within the country a state of unrest... [These experiences]taught us a precious
truth mainly that the Revolution did not belong to any one group in particular,
but all of the Cuban people. Consequentlyall energies of our militants in the
mountains and cities were aimed toward that end.34
30
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Additionally, Che remarked that due to repression, the peasants joined the
Rebel Army resulting in 'an army of civilians [becoming] an army of
peasants'. In this and the previous speech, Che pointed out the role that
other groups played in the revolution, but at the same time emphasised
that the Rebel Army led the struggle in the vanguard position.
Because the later history of the Cuban Revolution and the foco theory
minimised the role of the llano, these speeches can be interpreted as
attempts by thefidelistas to increase their base of support by bringing other
groups under the umbrella of the overall struggle. Guevara's recognition
of the importance of the working class coincided with the expulsion by
anti-communist July 26 Movement elements of Popular Socialist Party
(PSP), members of the Executive Committee of the Confederation of
Cuban Workers (CTC), and their replacement by July 26 Movement
leaders.35 Also, classification of the Revolution as against a dictatorship
and not against the national bourgeoisie, reflected the representation of
the first cabinet, 'lawyers, judges, economists, ortodoxos,... and social
activists .36

In two separate interviews in April 1959, Guevara began to describe the
Revolution, somewhat cautiously, along class lines by denouncing those
sectors of the national bourgeoisie who opposed changes, such as agrarian
reform.37 According to Ramm, however, Guevara continued to deny that
the Cuban Revolution 'was a class revolution, its only enemies were
those who opposed land reform - latifundistasand the reactionary bourgeoisie'.38 Guevara specifically identified the reactionary bourgeoisie and
did not condemn the bourgeoisie in general. These two interviews reflect
a noticeable shift in Guevara's thought from recognition of the role of the
bourgeoisie in the revolution to regarding them as neither an ally nor an
enemy in the post-insurrectionary stage. Later, he would identify the
bourgeoisie as an obstacle to the construction of socialism.
Again, these changes serve as an index to national politics. In April, the
July 26 Movement accused the PSP of bourgeois tendencies and
collaboration with Batista.39 Guevara apparently anticipated the
bourgeoisie's unfavourable reaction to the Agrarian Reform Law of 17
May 959. The Law resulted in the resignation of five moderate members
of the July 26 Movement who held positions in the cabinet.40 Two
months later, Castro forced the resignation of President Manuel Urrutia,
35
37

36
Perez-Stable,CubanRevolution,
Ibid., p. 62.
p. 70.
The interviews were conducted on i8 April 1959 and 28 April I959 and appear in
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38 Ramm, Marxism
of Regis Debray, p. 35.
39 Perez-Stable, Cuban Revolution,p.
71.
40 Gonzalez, Cuba Under Castro, p. 97, fn. 33.
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severely weakening bourgeoisie representation in the revolutionary
government.41 By early I960 the fidelistas firmly controlled all the
important positions of power, ready to radicalise the Revolution. In this
increasingly radical environment, where the sierra held government
positions they both did and did not deserve, Guevara wrote Guerrilla
Warfare.
Guerrilla Warfare42
From the first page of the first chapter of GuerrillaWarfareGuevara clearly
spells out the fundamental lessons of the Cuban Revolution.
Popular forces can win against the army.
It is not necessaryto wait until all the conditions for makingrevolutionexist;
the insurrectioncan create them.
(3) In underdeveloped America the countryside is the basic area of armed
fighting.43
(i)

(2)

The first lesson simply stated that a guerrilla army can defeat a regular
army. The second lesson caused Marxists to claim heresy as Che advocated
speeding up history and giving primacy to subjective conditions over
objective ones.44 And the third lesson called for the leadership, the base,
and the theatre of revolutionary struggle to be located in the mountains
directed by the sierra.
The overall focus of the manual lies in lessons number two and three.
Guevara even calculated the number of guerrillas necessary to form afoco
and begin the armed struggle:
The minimumnumberwith which it is possible to initiatea guerrillawar can be
mentioned. In my opinion, considering the normal desertions and weakness in
spite of the rigorous process of selection, there should be a nucleus of 30 to 50
men; this figure is sufficient to initiate an armed fight in any country of the
Americaswith their conditions of favourableterritoryfor operations,hunger for
land, repeatedattacksupon justice, etc.45
The above quote clearly draws from the sierra experience and does not
account for the important role played by urban groups. He then explains
that the guerrilla will be supplied internally by the peasants, not giving
credit to the essential role Frank Pais and the Santiago July 26 Movement
played in arming and supplying recruits following the disaster at Alegria
41
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de Pio.46 Nonetheless, Che does not completely ignore the role of the
urban underground or their potential, stating that 'the city's masses of
organized workers should not be underrated'.47 Guevara also spelled out
the essential duties of the llano in relation to propaganda, intelligence and
sabotage, but all the while emphasising their subordination to the
directives of the sierra.
Che developed a democratic corollary to GuerrillaWarfare,already cited
by Castafieda, which prevented the development of the armed struggle:
When a government has come to power through some form of popular vote,
fraudulentor not, and maintainsat least an appearanceof constitutionallegality,
the guerrilla outbreak cannot be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful
struggle have not yet been exhausted.48
I will later discuss when and why Che abrogated the democratic exclusion.
Guevara also briefly touched on a point that would later be further
explored by Debray, the vanguard foco in place of the Leninist vanguard
party. 'The guerrilla fighter, as a person conscious of the role in the
vanguard of the people, must have a moral conduct that shows him to be
a true priest of reform.'49 The vanguard foco, however, does not solely
radicalise the peasantry; in addition, the peasants serve to politicise the
guerrilla fighters and vice versain a symbiotic revolutionary relationship:
It happensthat a genuineinteractionis producedbetweenthese leaders,who with
their acts teachthe people the fundamentalimportanceof the armedfight, and the
people themselves who rise in rebellion and teach the leaders these practical
necessitiesof which we speak. Thus, as a product of this interactionbetween the
guerrillafighterand his people, a progressiveradicalizationappearswhich further
accentuates the revolutionary characteristicsof the movement and gives it a
national scope.50
In summary, GuerrillaWarfareplaces primary importance on the role of
the foco in creating conditions for revolution. Both the base of operations
and leadership are to be located in the sierra. Guerrilla Warfare did not
totally exclude the role of the llano in the revolutionary struggle, nor did
it adequately accredit it. The democratic corollary stated that guerrilla
movements could not be pursued in countries such as Mexico, Costa Rica,
Chile and Venezuela. While Guerrilla Warfareis not a true representation
of the Cuban Revolution, it does present most of its principal
phenomena, albeit in a distorted manner.
It is important to note that throughout the work Che emphasised he
was drawing from the Cuban Revolution: 'I repeat once more, it is our
46
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Cuban experience which speaks through me; new experiences can vary
and improve these concepts. We offer an outline, not a bible.'51 This point
has two important implications. First, since the Cuban experience 'spoke
through Che', he was retelling the Cuban Revolution, and thus the
ahistorical elevated role of the sierra and the minimised role of the llano
served to legitimise fidelista monopolisation of power. Second, Guevara's
emphasis on representing an 'outline' and not a 'bible' would later be
ignored as the foco theory became increasingly theoretical and dogmatic.52
The remainder of the article will proceed by examining the changes which
occurred in the foco theory from the publication of Guerrilla Warfareuntil
Che's death in Bolivia in 1967, by juxtaposing these corrections or
distortions (depending on your interpretation) against a political and
historical backdrop.
'Sierraisation' of the Foco,

1960-2

The three years following the publication of Guerrilla Warfare witnessed
a strong and gradual shift towards increasing the importance of the sierra
in the foco theory. I will label this trend and period 'sierraisation' of the
foco owing to the elevated role of the sierrain the foco theory. The process
by which the sierra became increasingly important in the armed struggle
was not limited solely to the period 1960-2, and is a recurring theme until
1967; nonetheless, these years represent the time frame for the most
commonly marked changes in the foco theory. 'Sierraisation' of the foco,
was followed by 'Marxianisation' of the foco, I963-5, and 'internationalisation' of the foco, 1965-7; the later two periods will be analysed in the
following sections. By employing this categorisation and periodisation I
am not implying that these were the only types of changes made during
the indicated periods, for there is considerable overlap. Despite the
deficiencies in this categorisation and periodisation, the approach will
assist in analysing the foco theory and identifying its major trends.53
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Unsurprisingly, these categories correspond to Guevara's primary roles in the Cuban
government. Che became president of the National Bank in I959 and quickly
surrounded himself with veterans of the sierra. From I962 to I965, Che challenged
many of the 'old Communists' during the 'Great Debate', justifying his unorthodox
Marxism by quoting the early writings of Marx. And from i965 onward, Che made
several trips throughout the world where he personally sought to 'export' the Cuban
Revolution.
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In March I960, Guevara spoke on television and affirmed that for Cuba
to be politically sovereign, she would have to be economically independent
from the metropolises, specifically the United States.54 According to
Guevara, Cuba would have to break free from her colonial economic
structure of providing raw materials and dependence on sugar exports in
order to be politically independent. Although many agreed with Guevara's
economic plan of diversification, several within the government, both
Marxist and non-Marxist, but all primarily former bourgeois representatives of the llano, voiced opposition. Disagreements, however, were not
welcomed as demonstrated by Guevara replacing Felipe Pazos as president
of the National Bank in the fall of 1959. The fidelistas of the sierra chose
the correct path in the armed struggle and assumed they could do the same
in the economic struggle as well.
Several months later, Guevara turned his attention to the working class
of Cuba and its role in industrialisation.55 The speech incorporated the
working class into the revolution via the foco in the post-insurrectionary
stage. Hodges carefully analysed the speech claiming the 'original aim [of
the revolutionary movement] to mobilize the peasants through a
programme of agrarian reform subsequently shifted during its constructive stage to the principle of mobilizing the workers through a
program of industrialization'.56 The speech, according to Hodges,
justifies the sierra bias of the foco theory by claiming that although the
proletariat does not play the primary role in the insurrectionary stage, its
participation will be fundamental in the post-revolutionary period.57
The increasing polarisation between the United States and Cuba is
reflected in Guevara's speech made at the First Congress of Latin
American Youth in July I960.58 Earlier in the year, Mikoyan visited
Havana, establishing the first trade agreements between the two countries
and confirming Washington's suspicion of the communist turn in the
Cuba Revolution.59 In June, after Texaco, Shell and Standard Oil refused
to refine Soviet crude oil, the Cuban government confiscated their
holdings. A rapid deterioration of relations between the two countries
followed, in which the sugar quota was cut and United States properties
54 Speech delivered on the television programme 'Universidad Popular', 20 March I960
and printed the following day in Revolucion,pp. i-8. Reprinted in Bonachea and Vald6s,
Che, 'Political Sovereignty and Economic Independence', pp. 213-29.
55
Speech delivered to the Havana assembly of workers on 18 June I960 and printed in
Obra Revolucionario,
I960, no. II. Reprinted in Venceremos!,as 'On Sacrifice and
56 Hodges, Legacy of Che Guevara, p. 28.
Dedication', pp. 92-108.
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nationalised.60 Castro realised by late i959 and the first months of I960
that if Cuba wanted to follow through with its radical reforms it would
have to attract the security of the Soviet Union. Thus, Cuba began a
process whereby its leaders 'seduced' the Soviets by quoting Marx and
Lenin and carrying out anti-United States policies.61
Guevara's speech, in which he neither labelled the revolution socialist
nor claimed that it was not socialist, reflected contemporary politics and
expediency. Che developed a masterful compromise:
[I]s the CubaRevolution communist?Some will wishfully state this is so, or that
it is moving in that direction. Others, perhaps feeling disappointed, will also
answerin the affirmative,and still others with disappointmentwill think that this
is not a communist revolution. Others, still hoping, will answer no. And if
someone asks me if this Revolution before your eyes is a communist revolution,
I would reply (leaving aside all the accusations made by imperialismand the
colonial powers who try to bring confusion to everything) that we realize that
this revolution, if it happens to be Marxist- and listen carefully,I say Marxist

- is thus because it discoveredby its own means the path that Marx pointed out.

[emphasisadded]62
The dominant theme of the speech, clearly indicated in the above quote,
is that the truths of Marxism are not understood solely from studying
Marx; rather, they can be naturally discovered through the revolutionary
process. Not only is this statement interesting because of its claim of the
natural discovery of Marxism, but the audience was made up of students.
It can be deduced that Che was indirectly mocking those who simply
studied Marx and did not put his ideas into practice.
The speech could very easily be placed in the category of
'Marxianisation' of the foco; nonetheless, I believe it has important
reference for the 'sierraisation' of the foco. Guevara advocated going
beyond simply studying Marx by making an existential commitment to
revolutionary action. Guevara implied that because the guerrillas were not
as versed in Marxism as the PSP, the Cuban Revolution occurred. Thus,
as a result of subjective conditions, the foco brought about the Cuban
Revolution and, in the process, discovered the 'path that Marx pointed
60
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out'. In the end, Guevara claimed that because he had learned Marxism
in its appropriate laboratory of revolutionary action, rather than through
books or party cells in the llano, his Marxian credentials were more valid.63
Guevara's speech to the First Congress of Latin American Youth, later
became more forcefully represented in an article which appeared in
October
He specifically sought to reply to the Leninist
I960.64
doctrine
that 'without a revolutionary theory there is no
revolutionary
which refuted his contention of naturally
movement',
revolutionary
discovering Marxism and the primacy of military actions over political
ones:
This is a unique Revolution which some people assert contradicts one of the most
orthodox premises of the revolutionary movement expressed by Lenin: 'without
a revolutionary theory, there is no revolutionary movement'. It would be suitable
to state that a revolutionary theory, as the expression of a social truth, is beyond
any enunciation of it, that is to say, the revolution can be made if the historical
realities are interpreted correctly and if the forces involved are utilized correctly.65
To be direct, Guevara claimed Lenin was wrong. The Cuban Revolution
demonstrated that there could be a revolutionary movement without a
revolutionary theory. He then went on to claim: 'One should be a
in physics, or a
"Marxist"
as naturally as one is a "Newtonian'
"Pasteurian" in biology considering that if new facts determine new
concepts these new concepts will never take away that path of truth which
the older concept had.'66 Che emphasised pragmatism rather than
In an interview with Laura
adherence to dogmatic interpretations.
in
November
he
once
I960,
Berquist
again referred to the importance and
of
truth
validity
through revolutionary praxis. 'Where one
discovering
really learns is in a revolutionary war; every mistake teaches you more
than a million volumes of books. You mature in the extraordinary
university of experience.'67
Guevara's constant return to the maxim of discovering truth through
revolutionary action served in part to defend himself from his Marxian
critics, but also, and perhaps more importantly, to remind others of the
inactivity of the PSP in the revolutionary war. The 'old Communists' did
not join the armed struggle until late I958 and played a largely
63
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insignificant role. Following the revolutionary victory, Castro resurrected
the PSP for administrative reasons and to garner Soviet recognition. In
the process, however, the PSP represented a force which could, and did,
challenge Castro's political authority. The foco theory's supremacy of
subjective conditions and the concentration of political activity in the
countryside served to check PSP power and reinforce their historically
unrevolutionary attitude.
In April I96I, before the Bay of Pigs invasion, Guevara answered his
critics once again with the article 'Cuba: Exceptional Case or Vanguard
in the Struggle Against Colonialism'.68 The article was addressed to the
Latin American communist parties who claimed, just as the PSP had, that
the conditions were not appropriate for armed revolution. Guevara
recognised two 'exceptional characteristics' of the Cuban revolution: (i)
the leadership of Fidel Castro; and (2) a somewhat 'proletarianised'
peasantry. These aside, the objective conditions in Cuba at the time of the
revolution could be found throughout Latin America. Guevara
summarised the hemispheric universality of objective conditions from the
'Rio Bravo to the South Pole' as 'Hunger of the People':
Weariness from being oppressed, abused, and exploited to the maximum;
wearinessfrom selling one's labor day after day for fear of becoming part of the
great massof the unemployed- all so that maximumprofitis squeezedfrom each
human body only to be squanderedin the orgies of the owners of capital.69
Guevara claimed that the common denominator of 'Hunger of the
People' made almost all of Latin America ripe for revolution. Only the
'[s]ubjective conditions were missing in America - the most important
being the consciousnes of the possibility of victory through violent
struggle against the imperialist powers and their internal allies'.70
According to Guevara, objective conditions were present everywhere, but
only in Cuba through the exceptional leadership of Castro were the
subjective conditions developed to carry out the revolution. Repeatedly,
Guevara emphasised the primacy of subjective conditions and the
necessity for the political struggle to be subordinate to the armed struggle.
Also, he touched upon his theme once again of discovering 'through
revolutionary praxis the correct methods of achieving socialism'.
Although addressed to Latin American communist parties, Guevara's
article solicited a response from PSP leader Anlbal Escalante in Verde
Olivo, the official organ of the Cuban Armed Forces. The article, entitled
'The True Breeding Ground of Communism', challenged Guevara's
notion of the discovery of the truths of Marxism through revolutionary
struggle. More importantly, Escalante attacked Guevara's primacy on
68
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subjective conditions in determining the revolutionary victory in Latin
America - amazingly citing the Cuban Revolution as a counter example.71
Escalante claimed that the 'exceptional' nature of the Cuban Revolution
was not subjective, as Guevara had suggested; rather, Cuba's objective
level of capitalist development was one of the highest in Latin America.
Escalante's open challenge to the validity of the foco theory presaged the
division between the 'old Communists' and the veterans of the sierra,
which would later become fully manifest in the 'Escalante Affair'.
In January 1962, the Organisation of American States (OAS) adopted
several resolutions which directly criticised Cuba, such as: 'The principles
of Communism are incompatible with the principles of the Inter-american
system', and the 'present government of Cuba, which has officially
identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist government, is incompatible with
the Inter-american system'.72 Castro wasted no time in responding to
hemispheric isolation when in February 1962 he released his famous
Second Declaration of Havana claiming the 'duty of every revolutionary
is to make the revolution'. Any support previously given secretly by
Castro to insurgent groups was now done openly and defiantly. From
1962

until Guevara's

death in October

1967, Cuba actively

pursued

a

policy of 'exporting the revolution' through hosting numerous conferences, supporting hemispheric and international organisations, and
providing arms and funds to insurgents.73
While the Second Declaration of Havana represented the strongest
statement to date on the role of the subjective conditions, Edward
Gonzalez noted a passage which tends to contradict the 'sierraisation' of
the foco:

[T]he peasantryis a classwhich, becauseof the uncultivatedstatein which it lives,
needs the revolutionaryand political leadershipof the working class and revolutionary
intellectualsfor without them it would not by itself be able to plunge into the
struggle and achieve victory. [emphasis added by Gonzalez]74

Gonzalez then went on to explain in a footnote that 'the reference to the
leadership of the working class appears to have been a concession to
communist orthodoxy: The Second Declaration of Havana came on the
71 See
Draper, Castroism: Theoryand Practice, pp. 84-99 for Escalante's challenge to the
Guevara line.
72 OAS actions followed Castro's 2 December
1961 claim that he was a Marxist-Leninist.
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heels of Castro's public conversion to Marxism-Leninism in his speech of
2 December I96I'.75 The 'concession', however, was highly restricted
because the following month Castro moved against the leading proponents
of communist orthodoxy, Anibal Escalante and other PSP members who
held important positions in the Integrated Revolutionary Organisation
(ORI). In the end, as Gonzalez remarks, the statement should be regarded
as a 'concession' which does not represent a significant reorientation of
the foco theory.
Another interesting aspect of the Second Declaration of Havana is its
childlike portrayal of the peasantry. The earlier statement of Guevara in
Guerrilla Warfare of 'a genuine interaction' whereby 'leaders teach the
people' and 'people teach the leaders' is replaced by the stronger
vanguard position that the peasantry need appropriate 'revolutionary'
and 'political leadership' owing to their 'uncultivated state'. Overall, the
Second Declaration of Havana follows the general trend of increasing
emphasis on subjective conditions and the role of the foco in developing
them.
In March 1962, in the 'Escalante Affair', Cuba experienced its most
decisive government shake up since the tense months of June-November
1959 which witnessed Manual Urrutia's forced resignation and rebel
leader Hubert Matos's imprisonment.76 After Fidel declared the socialist
nature of the Cuban Revolution, only days before the Bay of Pigs
invasion, a proto-communist party was created combining the July 26
Movement, the Revolutionary Student Directorate, and the PSP into one
apparatus, appropriately called the ORI. Perez-Stable logically remarks
that the PSP was given significant authority within the ORI since they had
the personnel, experience in organising parties, and 'knew about socialism,
vanguard parties, and the Soviet Union, [while the] July 26 Movement
and Revolutionary Student Directorate did not'.77 Surprisingly, Anibal
Escalante who characterised the Cuba Revolution as 'bourgeoisdemocratic' and advocated the inclusion of the 'national bourgeoisie'
because the 'socialist transformation was not foreseen in the immediate
future', headed the task of creating the ORI.78 The ORI was formed in
July 1961, but its national directorate was not announced until 9 March
1962. Escalante gave preference to the 'old communists' who received ten
seats on the 25-member National Directorate. The PSP within the ORI
clearly threatened Castro's authority. Two weeks after the selection of the
75
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ORI National Directorate, Castro attacked Escalante on national
television, removing him from power.79
While the division between the 'old communists' and the fidelistascould
be found in various issues of the 'Escalante Affair', apparently an
important one was the foco theory. After the July 26 Movement gained
clear control of the ORI, membership in the party required 'acceptance of
the two Declarations of Havana as the party's program'.80 The very fact
that this was required reflects the strong division the foco theory created
within Cuban politics and the need to demand its adherence.
'Sierraisation' of the foco, in summary, defines the process whereby the
sierra members of the armed struggle played an increasingly elevated role
in thefoco theory. This phenomenon resembled a similar tempo in national
politics, and at times, was even a part of it. Guevara's unfavourable
perception of the bourgeoisie in the armed struggle deprived the llano of
an important role in the overall struggle. In addition, Che's notion of the
natural discovery of Marxism through armed struggle reinforced and
justified his contention that military action precedes political action; the
former crystallised the latter. In the following two sections it becomes
increasingly difficult to draw similarities between changes in the foco
theory and national politics. The primary explanation for this difficulty is
that Cuban politics is notably less dynamic and volatile as a result of the
fidelistas' consolidation of power.
'Marxianisation'

of the Foco, 1962-;

Following the 'Escalante Affair', Guevara gave a speech to the
Department of State Security which identified an additional set of
conditions to initiate the armed struggle.81 Guevara cited factors which
show a pronounced Leninist shade such as the extent of imperialist
penetration, the geographical distance from the Yankee metropolis, and
the influence of Cuban revolutionary ideas. Hodges claims that 'Che
identified an entirely new set of factors for the viability of armed
struggle'.82 Personally, I feel Hodges's statement is too strong;
nonetheless, there is an apparent shift in Guevara's writings on guerrilla
79 Castroaccused Escalanteof not organising a party, but a 'straight jacket', a 'yoke', a
'counterrevolutionarymonstrosity', for promoting 'sectarianism',and for attempting
to make the ORI 'a machinefor personalaims'. Suarez,CastroismandCommunism,
p.
I52. Guevara echoed Castro's denunciation of Escalante in a speech the following
month: 'There had appearedthroughout the country, as a baneful vice that it was
necessary for us to eliminate completely, aloofness from the masses, dogmatism,
sectarianism.Because of them, we were threatened by bureaucratism.'Quoted in
80
81
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Lowy, Marxism of Che Guevara, p. 8, fn. 9.
Dominguez, Cuba: Order and Revolution,p. 21 I.
Guevara, 'La Influencia de la Revoluci6n Cubana en la America Latina', pp. 469-92.
Hodges, Legacy of Che Guevara, p. 23.
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warfare in which it becomes increasingly cloaked in the Marxian lexicon.
I will refer to this shift as 'Marxianisation' of the foco, I962-5. The
'sierraisation' of the foco still operated during this period and remained
a strong and noticeable theme of the writings, but the tone of the works
reflected a clear Marxian influence. My purpose is not to make an
assessment of Guevara's Marxism or Marxian revolutionary theory, but
simply to distinguish Che's later writings from his earlier ones by the
increasing presence of Marx. The 'Marxianisation' of the foco coincided
with two events which influenced this trend: first, the 'Great Debate';
and second, the arrival of Regis Debray.
An article written by Guevara in October I962, during the Cuban
missile crisis, reflects both the 'Marxianisation' and the 'internationalisation' of thefoco.83Any previous notion of cooperation with the national
bourgeoisie in the revolutionary struggle was dropped:
The frightenedbourgeoisie is faced with a terriblechoice: submissionto foreign
capital or destruction by domestic popular forces. This dilemma has been
accentuatedby the Cuban revolution; through the polarization created by its
example, the only alternativeleft is to sell out. When this takes place, when the
pact is sanctioned, the domestic revolutionaryforces ally themselves with the
most powerful internationalreactionaryforces, and the peacefuldevelopment of
social revolution is prevented.84
Guevara claimed the very example of the Cuban Revolution changed the
overall revolutionary strategy for Latin America, preventing an alliance
with the national bourgeoisie. As a result, the revolution would now take
on a more pronounced class structure. Guevara also declared that the
Latin American revolution would be socialist and thereby alienated
progressive, yet anti-communist, members of the opposition.
Guevara's frequent criticisms of the national bourgeoisie and communist parties in Latin America, in addition to the restructuring of the
Cuban government after the 'Escalante Affair', are reflected in Guevara's
prologue to El Partido Marxista-Leninista. The work takes considerable
liberty in describing the differences between the sierraand the llano during
the revolutionary war.85
There was within the revolutionarymovement a series of contradictionswhich
we call the sierraand llanowhich manifestedthemselvesin diametricallydifferent
analysesof the elements consideredfundamentalto decide armed struggle... the
83 The article entitled 'Tactics and
Strategy of the Latin American Revolution', according
to the Cubangovernment, was written during the missile crisis of October I962, yet

remainedunpubisheduntil after Guevara'sdeath. Reprintedin Bonacheaand Valdes,
Che, pp. 77-88.

84

Ibid., p. 79.

85 Ernesto Che Guevara, 'Prol6go', El Partido Marxista-Leninista(Havana, 1963).
Reprintedin Bonacheaand Valdes, Che,'The Role of a Marxist-LeninistParty', pp.
I02-I
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sierra was ready to engage the army as often as necessary... llano favored

generalized armed struggle culminating in a revolutionary general strike that
would expel the Batista dictatorshipand establish a government of 'civilians'
converting the new army into an apoliticalinstitution.... These differenceswere
deeper than tactical discrepancies:the Rebel Army was already ideologically
proletarianand thought as a dispossessed class; the urban leadershipremained
petty bourgeois with future traitorsamong its leaders.86
Clearly this was an exaggeration of the Cuban experience. The sierra/llano
dichotomy, while existing during the revolutionary war, was not as
decisive or as class based as Guevara implied. Indeed, to claim the 'Rebel
Army was already ideologically proletarian' is a severe distortion of the
Cuban reality. Biographical research on membership of both the July 26
Movement and the PSP detailing occupation and class standing, as well as
parents, clearly demonstrates fidelista leadership to be overwhelmingly
bourgeois, with the PSP more representative of the proletarian class.87
An implicit assumption of the 'prologue' to El Partido MarxistaLeninista, pointed out by Bonachea and Valdes, is that the countryside has
a 'proletarianising' effect, whereas the city encourages the process of
'embourgeoisement'.88 Unfortunately, no dissenting opinion within Cuba
contested this analysis, as occurred earlier concerning Guevara's natural
discovery of Marxism through revolutionary action. Apparently, the
'Escalante Affair' served to silence anyone who dissented.89 The national
bourgeoisie were portrayed once again in a pejorative manner because
'faced with the dilemma of choosing between the people and imperialism,
the weak national bourgeoisie have chosen imperialism'.90
Beginning in 1962 and continuing until I965, a 'Great Debate' took
place in Cuba over economic policy. In brief, the debate centred around
how to construct socialism. Guevara and others advocated pursuing a
policy of moral incentives to construct the 'new man' and develop the
communist conciencia.Carlos Rafael Rodriguez and other members of the
PSP advocated material incentives. The debate stretched over three years
86

Ibid., pp. o06-7.

87 David

Crain,'The Course of the CubanHeresy: The Rise and Decline of Castroism's
Challengeto the Soviet Line in the Latin AmericanMarxistRevolutionaryMovement,
I963-1970',

unpubl. PhD diss., Indiana University, 197I, p. 296; and Wickham-

Crowley, 'Sociological Analysis of Latin American GuerrillaMovements', pp. 21-3.
Universo Sanchez and Crescencio Perez are the notable members of the July 26
Movement who could be consideredproletarian.
88 Bonachea and Valdes, 'Introduction', Che, p. 16. The editors refer to Guevara's
unorthodox Marxianformulationas 'guerrilla communism'.
89 The lessons of the 'EscalanteAffair'were reinforcedin March
1964 when formerPSP
memberMarcosRodriguezwas arrestedand sentencedto death for having revealedto
Batista'spolice force the whereaboutsof the surviving studentsfrom the Revolutionary
Directorate who launched the attack on the PresidentialPalace on 13 March I957.
Gonzalez, Cuba under Castro, p. 103.
90 Guevara, 'Role of Marxist-Leninist Party', p. o05.
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and reflected a case of limited pluralism. However, with Guevara making
statements that the struggle in the llano resulted in the
'embourgeoisement' of the revolution and describing the national
bourgeoisie as 'weak', the position of moral incentives was strengthened.
In the end, moral incentives triumphed in the 'Great Debate', with Castro
advocating Guevara's position in I966.91
In September 1963, Guevara wrote, 'Guerrilla Warfare: A Method',
which can be considered a preface to the second edition of Guerrilla
Warfare since it repeated and confirmed the three lessons of the earlier
work.92 He made, however, two important changes. First, Che dropped
the democratic corollary, previously discussed, which served to check the
development of guerrilla insurgencies. He now argued: 'We should
not allow "democracy" to be utilised apologetically to represent the
dictatorship of the exploiting classes.'93 Previously, in Guerrilla Warfare,
Guevara claimed that democracy 'fraudulent or not' caused 'the guerrilla
outbreak' to 'not be promoted, since the possibilities of peaceful struggle
have not been exhausted'.94 Once Cuban politics became Marxist, it was
only natural for Guevara to dismiss democracy as an obviation for armed
struggle. For if Che continued to regard democracy as the effective
preventive measure to counter guerrilla warfare, he would be indirectly
claiming the impossibility of revolutionary conditions in democratic
political systems, and further, dismissing the role of objective capitalist
exploitation and subjective commitment to revolutionary action which are
paramount in all Marxist revolutionary theorists.
The second point, primary emphasis of the article, and a nuance in his
writings, is the desired polarisation of society into well defined classes
from which a socialist revolution would be waged:
The equilibriumbetween oligarchic dictatorshipand the popular pressuremust
be changed. The dictatorshiptries to function without resortingto force. Thus,
we must try to oblige the dictatorshipto resort to violence, thereby unmasking
its true natureas the dictatorshipof the reactionarysocial classes. This event will
deepen the struggle to such an extent that there will be no retreatfrom it. The
performanceof the people's forces dependson the task of forcing the dictatorship
to a decision - to retreator unleash the struggle.95
Once class antagonisms were fully developed, the guerrilla war would
ensue and after victory society would already be ready for the construction
of socialism. The language, flavour, and frequent citations of Lenin, Marx
and Engels all represent a distinct tone not present in Guerrilla Warfare.
91 For an examinationof the 'Great Debate' and the various individuals involved see
BertramSilverman(ed.), ManandSocialismin Cuba:TheGreatDebate(New York, I97I).
92
in Bonacheaand Valdis, Che,'GuerrillaWarfare:A Method', pp. 89-103.
93 Reprinted
94 Guevara, GuerrillaWarfare,p. 48.
Ibid.,p. 93.
95 Guevara, 'Guerrilla Warfare:A Method', p. 95.
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The switch is a clear reflection of national and international politics. In
1960, when Guerrilla Warfare was published, the socialist nature of the
Cuban Revolution had yet to be declared. By 1963, on the other hand, the
Soviet Union had admitted Cuba to the socialist camp. Just as politics
went through a process of 'Marxianisation', so did thefoco theory.96 Also,
the foco theory was still criticised and not accepted by orthodox
Communists. Guevara's repeated citation of Lenin and Marx strengthened
his defence against accusations of heresy.
An additional point which emerged during the period 1962-5, marking
a clear break from Guerrilla Warfare, was the change from pragmatism,
where Guevara emphasised that 'new experiences can vary and improve
these concepts [and] we offer an outline not a bible', to strict adherence
to the foco theory.97 Guevara's increasing theoretical rigidity is clearly
spelled out in the prologue he wrote to Vo Nguyen Giap's, People's War,
People'sArmy.98 Che completely neglects the absolute primacy Giap gave
to the political struggle and selectively interprets the work to enable
himself to draw remarkable similarities to his own writings. Guevara even
went as far to claim that in Vietnam the liberation struggle began with a
mobile guerrilla foco.99 Ramm bluntly criticises Che's selective interpretation of Giap's' writing: 'Here we have a perfect example of how
Guevara deals with his fundamental differences with the Marxist-Leninist
tradition- he pretends they do not exist.... In short, Guevara's
propositions... are based on a highly dubious reading of Giap.'100
Added to this increasingly Marxist environment was the arrival of
Regis Debray, a young French intellectual recently graduated from the
Ecole Normale where he studied under the renowned Marxist scholar
Louis Althusser.101 Debray travelled to Cuba in 1959, and then returned
in 1961 to fulfill the role of revolutionary ambassador: 'At their [Cuban
authorities'] invitation Debray became the only man to have personally
witnessed the travail of the revolutionary movement in every major Latin
American republic in a series of visits from 196 to I967.'1?2 Between I963

and 1964, Debray travelled to every country of South America except
Paraguay, where he had intimate contact with numerous guerrilla
96

In a CBS interview in December I964 Guevara stated: 'In America, the road to the
liberationof the peoples, which will be the road to socialism,will be opened by armed
struggle in nearly all countries.' Quoted in Lowy, Marxismof CheGuevara,p. 86.

97 Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 132.
Reprinted in Bonachea and Valdes, Che, 'People's War, People's Army', pp. I49-54.
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100 Ibid., pp. 83-4.
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movements. Debray's well-developed Leninist background served to
complement and theorise Guevara's anarchistic Marxism.103
After Debray's guerrilla tour of 1963 and 1964, he wrote two essays
which retold his experiences.104 Debray took Guevara's notion of a
vanguard foco, in place of the vanguard party, one step further.
The presenceof a vanguardpartyis not... an indispensablepre-conditionfor the
launching of an armed struggle... it is possible to do without a vanguard
Marxist-Leninist party of the working class.... An anti-imperialistnational
liberation struggle in a colonial or semi-colonialterritorycannot be conducted
underthe bannerof Marxism-Leninismor the leadershipof the working class for
obvious reasons:defacto'aristocratization'of the relativelysmall working class,
the nationalistcharacterof the anti-imperialiststruggle. As for the party,that will
be formed and its cadres will be selected through the natural process of the
liberationstruggle, as happenedin Cuba.'05
Debray's wholesale dismissal of the working class '[flrom the standpoint
of traditional Marxism-Leninism, is a major, if not the greatest, heresy '.06
The main point Debray makes is that a vanguard party is unnecessary
because the role of such a party is undermined by the guerrilla army which
must be primary in the Latin American revolution.
Of all the countries Debray visited, he was most thoroughly informed
on the events in Venezuela. In I963, the Venezuelan Communist Party
(PCV) adopted the armed struggle and received praise from Castro for
doing so. Nonetheless, throughout i964 a division emerged between the
PCV and its armed wing, the Armed Forces of National Liberation
(FALN) over strategy. Douglas Bravo, the leader of the FALN, cited the
writings of Havana to justify his claims for the necessity of the sierra to
be independent of llano directives in pursuing the armed struggle. The
PCV, however, desired to keep the FALN subordinate to their directions.
The rift between the Venezuelan left over strategy served to weaken and
divide it. Debray decided that a vanguard party would not be necessary
during the initial stage of the struggle because it would, in fact, present
more problems than advances. Thus, what Debray calls 'Castroism'
(which is Guevara's foco theory) is Leninism adapted to Latin American
conditions. Debray's 'Castroism' and Guevara'sfoco theory has the sierra
103

Ramm, perhaps, states this point too strongly: 'Guevara's acquaintance with Leninist
thought was scanty, ... the burden of the theoretical struggle passed to the brilliant,
young, French intellectual, Regis Debray.' Marxism of Regis Debray, p. viii. Ramm's
overall thesis is that Debray 'Leninized Guevara'.
104 The first was a lengthy essay published in January I965, 'Castroism: The Long March
in Latin America', and the second was published in March of the same year 'Problems
of Revolutionary Strategy in Latin America'. Both essays are reprinted in Regis
Debray, Strategyfor Revolution.
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serve as the surrogate for the Leninist vanguard party in the struggle, but
they do not adequately address the necessity for politicising the masses in
conjunction with the armed struggle; they regard the process as one and
the same.
In 1966 Debray combined his earlier essays into a book, Revolutionin the
Revolution?, published

in Havana in January I967.107 Debray takes the

vanguard foco to the next logical step by eliminating the party altogether
and infusing it into the foco:
undercertainconditions,thepolitical and military are not separate, butform one organic
whole, consistingof the people's army, whosenucleusis the guerrilla army. The vanguard
party can exist in theform of the guerrillafoco itself. The guerrillaforce is the party in
embryo.[emphasis in original]108

He then goes on to comment on the numerous logistical problems an
urban support network presents, such as unity of command and
sectarianism. Further, Debray claims any ties to the city serve to weaken
the armed struggle because the city is where the dictatorship is strongest
and the insurgency most vulnerable. Debray quotes Castro: 'The city is
the cemetery of the Revolutionaries and resources' and then goes on to
add himself, 'the police and their North American advisers wait on their
home ground until the guerrilla leaders come to the city'.109 For Debray,
the 'weakest link' of the foco lies in the llano, and conversely, the 'weakest
link' of the dictatorship is found in the sierra. As a result, all political and
military activity should be concentrated in the mountains. The most
effective method to counter the inherent weaknesses of the llano is to
divorce it altogether from the armed struggle, postponing the formation
of a party until later: ' The people's army will be the nucleus of the party, not vice

versa. The guerrilla forces is the political vanguard in nuce and from its
development a real party can arise' [emphasis in original].1l0 Debray's
representation of thefoco is the most extreme example of the 'sierraisation'
107
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in theRevolution
?: ArmedStruggleandPoliticalStrugglein Latin
Regis Debray, Revolution
America (New York, 1967). Following Che's death many blamed Debray for severely
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Americas and the first printing entailed more than 200,000 copies for a mass audience
indicates Debray's work had the backing of the Cuban government. Ramm, Marxism
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the Revolution,p. 7.
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of the foco where the llano plays no role at all. The theoretical conclusions
of Debray are so far removed from the Cuban Revolution that they no
longer fundamentally resemble the Cuban experience.
'Internationalisation'of the Foco, i96/-7
The last categorisation of the foco, clearly evident before I965, is its
'internationalisation'. The years I965-7 distinguish the 'internationalisation' of the foco from previous years as the foco theory becomes
institutionalised in several Cuban foreign policy organisations of
international revolutionary support. Also, it coincides with Guevara's
personal efforts at internationalising the foco with his trips to the former
Belgian Congo, and his death in Bolivia. No fundamental changes occur
in the foco theory, it simply takes on a worldwide audience as Guevara
attempted to turn the Andean Cordillera into the Sierra Maestra of Cuba.
In February I965, Guevara spoke at the Second Economic Seminar of
Afro-Asian solidarity in Algiers, where his ideas took on a truly
international perspective.ll 'There are no frontiers in this struggle to the
death. We cannot remain indifferent in the face of what occurs in any part
of the world.'12 Geographical borders no longer represent any barriers in
the armed struggle nor should individuals be limited solely to the struggle
in their own country.
The theme of the speech was not confined to international revolutionary
solidarity, but also represented Third World nationalism. Cuba criticised
the Soviet Union for inadequately supporting Vietnam and pursuing
economic policies in underdeveloped countries that did not represent
authentic communist ethics.ll3 Guevara called for the advanced socialist
nations to invest their capital in underdeveloped countries committed to
building socialism: 'The development of the underdeveloped countries
must be underwritten by the socialist countries.'ll4 Che echoed his earlier
speech delivered in 1964 to the United Nations General Assembly where
he criticised the Soviet Union for pursuing imperialistic policies and
detente.15Basically, he called on the Soviet Union as the vanguard of the
socialist world to fulfil its role as leader. Without the appropriate
assistance of the Soviet Union in the Third World, Cuba would fill the
leadership void by becoming the representative of Third World interests
and revolution. Guevara hinted at the need for forming an organisation,
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similar to Afro-Asian solidarity, which would include the countries of all
three underdeveloped areas: Latin America, Africa, and Asia.
In January 1966, Guevara's proposal was adopted at the Tricontinental
Conference in Havana where the Organisation for Solidarity with the
Peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America (OSPAAL) was founded.116
The I2-member secretariat of OSPAAL included representatives from
Syria, Guinea, North Korea, Venezuela, Pakistan, the Congo and other
countries and colonies. The Latin American delegates to the conference,
in addition, founded the Organisation for Latin American Solidarity
(OLAS) to deal specifically with issues pertaining to the western
hemisphere. OLAS, however, had a short life. Its only conference was
held in August 1967, and after Guevara's death it became absorbed by
OSPAAL.117
From I965 to Guevara's death, no fundamental change occurred in the
foco theory since, in fact, there was little written by him or even about him
other than speculations concerning his whereabouts. In June I965,
Guevara left his post as Minister of Industries and disappeared. On 3
October i 965 Castro read Che's farewell letter which declared: 'Anywhere
I am, I will feel the responsibility of being a Cuban revolutionary and as
such I will act.'118What happened between his departure from Cuba and
the first entry on 7 November 966 of his BolivianDiary remains a mystery.
Most biographers of Guevara comment on his trip to the former Belgian
Congo and his participation in guerrilla activities, but the details are
scarce.119

The only document on guerrilla warfare authored by Guevara after his
disappearance in I965 was his 'Message to the Tricontinental' read in his
absence at the OLAS meeting

in August

of I967.120 The 'message'

is

clear; Che advocated creating numerous focos to divide the imperialist
forces of the United States through a protracted struggle as occurred in
Vietnam:
The CubanRevolution has before it a task of much greaterrelevance:to create
a second or a third Vietnam.... What a luminous, near future would be visible to
us if two, three or many Vietnams appearedthroughout the world with their
116
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Revolution,p. 270.
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in Latin America,
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shareof deathand immensetragedies,theirevery day heroismand repeatedblows
against imperialism, obliging it to disperse its forces under the attack and
increasinghatred of all peoples of the earth.121
Guevara called for the formation of manyfocos because neither the Soviet
Union nor China adequately assisted Vietnam which was left 'tragically
alone... by the representatives of the two greatest powers of the socialist
camp'. 22 According to Guevara, support included more than s simple
'wishing success to the victim of aggression, but of sharing his fate; one
must accompany him to his death or victory'.123 Guevara's personal
attempt to create another Vietnam resulted in the former.
With the internationalisation of thefoco, the motives for armed struggle
become increasingly less indigenous and directed against the entire
imperialistic system led by the United States. By minimising national
causes for revolution, and emphasising the universality of revolutionary
conditions, armed struggle becomes increasingly favourable in every
country integrated into the world capitalist system. Che selected Bolivia
more for its geographical suitability in launching 'two, three, or many
Vietnams', and less for indigenous reasons which are essential for a
guerrilla movement to survive. Che's BolivianDiary is a sad testament to
this fact.
Conclusion
Guevara's death was a devastating blow to Cuba's foreign policy and
brought about its rapid reorientation. In less than two years, Cuba
reestablished state to state relations with Venezuela and Peru, whose
guerrilla groups had received open support from Havana prior to
Guevara's death.124 In I970, Salvador Allende of Popular Unity was
elected president of Chile and embarked on the socialist path by the ballot,
not the bullet. The death of Guevara, and the apparent feasibility of the
peaceful road to socialism, resulted in an almost wholesale abandonment
of the foco theory for the pursuit of other tactics and strategies.
The theoretical distance travelled by the foco theory from the Cuban
Revolution to Guevara's death in Bolivia reflects a considerable distortion
of the Cuban experience. In 1960, when Guerrilla Warfarewas published,
the important role of the llanowas not accounted for. From 1960 to 1962,
the sierra's importance in the revolution took on an elevated, ahistorical
proportion. From 1963 to I965, as thefoco theory became 'Marxianised',
121
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it excluded reformist bourgeois members of the population. By declaring
the socialist nature of the armed struggle, it also attracted the close
attention of both the highly anti-communist national armies and the
United States. The 'internationalisation' of the foco resulted in international reasons for revolution superseding indigenous causes. The
entire period from 1960 to 1967 witnessed a fundamental shift away from
the Cuban experience, and, as a result, the Cuban experience became
unrepeatable.
After Debray's release from prison and a trip to Allende's Chile, he
began a major revision of his writings on guerrilla warfare. In an essay
entitled 'Time and Politics', Debray disavowed Guevara's second lesson
of the Cuban Revolution that the conditions for a revolutionary situation
can be created by thefoco. 'It is impossible to provoke or improvise crisis
situations artificially; every country, every locality, has its own special
historical time, its own pace, its speed of development.'125 Also, Debray
emphasised the need for a 'thorough nation-by-nation class analysis' to
take account of the 'historical, social, and economic' peculiarities of each
country to determine the appropriate strategy. Debray commended the
Chilean Revolution and advocated pursuing socialism through the
political struggle if possible.126 Debray's writing after 1967 accurately
point out that the Cuban Revolution had been misinterpreted in the
literature on guerrilla warfare, which, in part, accounts for the failure of
every armed group that adopted the foco theory.
Nicaragua appears to be the only country where the foco theory was
proved valid. FSLN strategy, however, underwent several fundamental
changes which brought the Nicaraguan strategy closer to the actual Cuban
Revolution

- in contrast to the foco theory. In I963, an FSLN foco was

found operating on the Honduran border ready to invade Nicaragua, and,
thus, begin the revolution. But thefoco did not have popular support and
was quickly defeated. In 1967, anotherfoco had formed around Matagalpa,
but it too was rapidly defeated. The defeat of the secondfoco and the death
of Che Guevara in the same year began a process whereby the FSLN
changed its strategy. Over the next 12 years the FSLN adopted a
protracted war strategy, created a strong llano wing of the FSLN to
politicise the masses, and even formed an alliance with the national
bourgeoisie. This broad base of support, as in the Cuban Revolution,
integrated the armed struggle of the countryside into the political struggle
of the cities. Loveman and Davies succinctly summarise the changes made
by the FSLN to Guevara's foco theory:
If the SandinistasinheritedChe Guevara'smost importantlegacy - the inspiration
125
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to challenge the dictatorshipthrough armed struggle- they were also forced to
modify profoundlythe tactical,strategic,and politicalimplicationsoffoquisimoin
order to prevail.
First, only armedstruggle proved sufficientto overthrow Somoza,... but only
protractedwarfarecombinedwith yearsof politicalorganizationand mobilization
brought thefoco's aspirationsto fruition. Second, this mobilizationrequiredthe
incorporation of significant numbers of entrepreneurs,clerics, workers, and
traditionalpolitical elites to oust the dictator. Third, even this political-military
alliance would likely have failed without extensive assistance from foreign
nations.... Finally, as in Cuba, the withdrawal of U.S. support from the
Nicaraguandictatorshipallowed domestic civil opposition to coalescearoundthe
less numerous FSLN cadres and defeat Somoza.127
Thus, moving beyond a foquista analysis, the Nicaraguan Revolution
demonstrates remarkable similarities with the actual Cuban Revolution. It
was not until the FSLN challenged the foco theory that they had any
success in the revolutionary struggle. When they finally developed a
strategy resembling the actual Cuban Revolution, Somoza seemed to fall
as rapidly and mysteriously as Batista. In the end, then, the triumph of the
Nicaraguan Revolution through its changes in the foco theory points out
the fundamental error's of Guevara's strategy.
In summary, a close examination of the emergence and evolution of the
foco theory juxtaposed to Cuban politics demonstrates it was not
formulated in a theoretical vacuum. Rather, there existed an apparent
discourse between Cuban politics and the evolution of the foco theory.
Changes made to the theory served to strengthen the veterans of the sierra
vis-a-vis the llano, i.e. 'old Communists', during the first years of the
revolutionary government. Since thefoco theory gave considerable weight
to subjective conditions and the sierra in the armed struggle, it served to
legitimise the fidelista centrality in the Cuban political apparatus. The
broad changes made to the foco theory, which I have categorised as
'Marxianisation 962-5 ', and 'internationalisation
'sierraisation 960-2',
the
main
thrust of Cuban politics and its leaders during
reflect
I965-7',
these years. Indeed, the above labels could easily be applied to the
economic, social and political policies of the i96os as well. After all,
policy, theory and the like are constructed at a specific time for a specific
reason - illuminating current political realities and the partiality of the
authors. Examining the emergence of ideas, programmes and actions in
a discourse manner, unearths a wealth of historical information buried just
below the surface.
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